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Abstract—Neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable against fault injection attacks. These attacks change the physical
behavior of the device during the computation, resulting in a change of value that is currently being computed. They can be realized by
various fault injection techniques, ranging from clock/voltage glitching to application of lasers to rowhammer.
In this paper we explore the possibility to reverse engineer neural networks with the usage of fault attacks. SNIFF stands for sign bit flip
fault, which enables the reverse engineering by changing the sign of intermediate values. We develop the first exact extraction method
on deep-layer feature extractor networks that provably allows the recovery of the model parameters. Our experiments with Keras library
show that the precision error for the parameter recovery for the tested networks is less than 10−13 with the usage of 64-bit floats, which
improves the current state of the art by 6 orders of magnitude. Additionally, we discuss the protection techniques against fault injection
attacks that can be applied to enhance the fault resistance.
Index Terms—Deep learning, Neural networks, Fault attacks, Reverse engineering, Model stealing
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Neural networks form a basis for current artificial intel-
ligence applications. They were shown to be effective in
domains that can provide large amount of labeled data
to be able to learn the classification model with sufficient
level of accuracy. Because of this property, companies often
protect their models as the cost of obtaining the data used
to train them might be very high, while the availability of
such data is limited. Thus, having a classification model
whose internal parameters are secret gives companies a
competitive advantage. It is therefore necessary to know the
ways that enable reverse engineering of the models so that
adequate protection could be applied.
Model stealing attacks (also called model extraction
attacks) aim at re-discovering the model in a black-box
settings [1]. In this setting, the attacker sends inputs to the
network and observes the outputs. Based on this informa-
tion, she tries to reconstruct the model that has accuracy
close to the original one. In a similar fashion, it is possible
to recover the hyperparameters of machine learning models
in general [2].
There are certain similarities when it comes to comparing
the model stealing attacks with the key recovery attacks
on cryptography. Classical cryptanalysis works by querying
the cryptosystem with inputs and observing the outputs.
This helps in getting the information about the secret key.
In the field of cryptography, researchers started observing
the physical characteristics of the devices that perform the
encryption to find the secret key more efficiently. Similarly, it
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was shown that by causing errors during the cryptographic
computation, the attacker can learn secret information [3].
We call these implementation-level attacks physical attacks
on cryptography.
Now, we can look into emerging area that are physical
attacks against neural networks. It was shown earlier that
side-channel attacks can be applied to neural networks to
recover certain model parameters [4]. It was also shown
that neural networks are vulnerable to fault injection attacks
that change the intermediate values of the model during
the computation, enabling misbehavior of the activation
functions in the model [5]. If we change the intermediate
values, the model output will change, potentially revealing
the information about the model parameters. We focus on
utilizing this behavior to fully recover the values of the
internal parameters of the neural network. More specifically,
we utilize a fault that changes the sign of the intermediate
values to get the information, hence the name SNIFF – sign
bit flip fault.
Our contribution. In this paper, we present a way to
reverse engineer neural networks with the help of fault
injection attacks. More specifically, we target deep-layer
feature extractor networks produced by transfer learning,
to recover the parameters (weights and biases) of the last
hidden layer. Our method provably allows exact extraction,
meaning that the exact values of parameters can be deter-
mined after the fault attack. Thus, in case of a deep-layer
feature extractor, this allows to get the exact information on
the entire network. We note that this is the first work using
fault injection attack for the model extraction, and also the
first work allowing exact extraction.
2 PRELIMINARIES
This section recalls general concepts used in the rest of the
paper. The target datasets and experimental setup are also
discussed.
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22.1 Fault Injection Methods
Fault injection can be performed with a variety of equip-
ment based on the required precision, cost and impact.
Clock/voltage glitch can be achieved using inexpensive
equipment that either varies the external clock signal to
the device or under-powers the supply voltage to the chip.
These methods offer limited precision and are normally
used to alter the control flow of the program rather than
disturbing the data directly. This is often referred to as global
fault injection.
Electromagnetic (EM) emanation is more localized method,
where the precision heavily depends on the resolution of the
injection probe. To disturb digital circuits, the attacker uses a
high voltage pulse generator that injects a sudden EM spike
through the injection probe. It was shown that precise bit
sets and resets in memory cells can be achieved [6].
Optical radiation includes methods with varying preci-
sion, using equipment ranging from camera flashes to lasers.
The main disadvantage of these methods is the need of de-
packaging of the device so that the chip components are vis-
ible to the light beam. The advantage is high reproducibility
of faults and great precision – precise bit flips were shown
to be possible with lasers.
Rowhammer is the only method on this list that does not
require a dedicated injection device. It was shown that by
using a repeated access to DRAM cells, there is a certain
probability to flip bits in adjacent rows of the memory. This
method was used in [7] to achieve accuracy loss of deep
learning models.
Besides these, there are other less researched fault injec-
tion methods, such as X-rays/gamma rays [8], or hardware
trojans [9]. While these can be very powerful, their practical-
ity is limited either because of strong attacker assumptions
or the cost of the injection device.
2.2 Fault Injection on Neural Networks
The seminal work in the field of adversarial fault injection
was published by Liu et al. in 2017 [10]. They introduced
two types of attacks: single bias attack changes the bias value
in either one of the hidden layers (in case of ReLU or
similar activation function) or output layer of the network
to achieve the misclassification; while gradient descent attack
works in a similar way than Fast Gradient Sign Method [11],
but changes the internal parameters instead of the input to
the network.
Practical fault injection by using a laser technique was
shown by Breier et al. in 2018 [5]. They were able to
disturb the instruction execution inside the general-purpose
microcontroller to achieve the change of the neuron output.
In their paper, they focused on behavior of three activation
functions: in case of sigmoid and tanh, the fault resulted
to inverted output, while in case of ReLU, the output was
forced to be always zero.
A comprehensive evaluation of bitwise corruptions on
various deep learning models was presented by Hong et al.
in 2019 [7]. They showed that most models have at least one
parameter such that if there is a bit-flip introduced in its
bitwise representation, it will cause an accuracy loss of over
90%.
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Fig. 1. Transfer learning using deep-layer feature extractor and fault
injection into the student model for recovering the newly added layer.
When it comes to fault and error tolerance of neural
networks, we would point interested reader to a survey
written by Torres-Huitzil and Girau in 2017 [12], which
provides exhaustive overview of this topic.
2.3 Transfer Learning
Transfer learning takes a pre-trained teacher model and
transfers the knowledge (model architecture and weights)
to a student model. The requirement is to have a similar
task for the newly trained student model compared to the
teacher model. Transfer learning is normally achieved by
“freezing” the first n − k layers of the teacher model out of
the total number of n layers – by fixing the values of the
weights. Then, the remaining k layers are removed and new
layers are added to the end of the student model. These
layers are then trained on the new data. There are 3 main
approaches that are used in transfer learning [13]:
• Deep-layer Feature Extractor: in this approach, the first
n−1 layers are frozen and only the last layer is updated,
as can be seen in Figure 1. It is normally used when
the student task is very similar to the teacher task. It
allows very efficient training. In the rest of the paper,
we will be focusing on the secret parameter recovery of
this approach.
• Mid-layer Feature Extractor: this approach freezes the
first n − k layers, where k < n − 1. It can be used in
case the student task is less similar to the teacher task
and there is enough data to train the Student.
• Full Model Fine-tuning: in this approach, all the layers
are unfrozen and updated during the student training.
It requires sufficient amount of data to fully train the
student, and is normally used for cases where student
task differs significantly from the teacher task.
Important observation when recovering the student
model is that the layers copied from the teacher are publicly
known, and therefore it is possible to derive the output
values for all the frozen layers for any input. This way, we
know the inputs to the layers trained by student, and the
outputs from the model. Based on this information, we are
able to design a weight recovery attack assisted by fault
injection.
2.4 Model Extraction
If we consider O(·) to be the original neural network model
we want to extract, Oˆ(·) denotes the extracted model. Jagiel-
3ski et al. [14] developed a taxonomy for model extraction
attacks and differentiate four different extraction types:
• Exact Extraction: strongest type of extraction, where
Oˆ = O, that is, both the architecture and the weights
of the extracted model have the same values as the
original network. It was shown to be impossible to
do such extraction for many types of neural networks
in black-box fault-free scenario, and therefore [14] only
focuses on the following three attacks.
• Functionally Equivalent Extraction: slightly weaker as-
sumption is considered for functionally equivalent ex-
traction, where the attacker is capable of constructing
Oˆ such that ∀x ∈ X , Oˆ(x) = O(x). In such case, it is
not necessary to match the two models exactly, only the
output of both models has to be the same for all the
elements from the domain X of the dataset D.
• Fidelity Extraction: for a target distribution DF
over X , and goal similarity function S(p1, p2), fi-
delity extraction tries to construct Oˆ that mini-
mizes Prx∼DF
[
S(Oˆ(x),O(x))
]
. The adversary nor-
mally wants to keep both the correct and incorrect
classification between the two models. A functionally
equivalent extraction achieves a fidelity of 1 on all
distributions and all distance functions.
• Task Accuracy Extraction: for a true task distribution DA
over X × Y , task accuracy extraction tries to construct
an Oˆ that maximizes Pr(x,y)∼DA
[
arg max(Oˆ(x)) = y
]
.
In this setting, the aim is to achieve the same or higher
accuracy than the original model. Therefore, it is the
easiest type of extraction attack to construct, as it does
not care about the original model’s mistakes.
2.5 Fault Types
It is important to consider what kind of fault we can achieve.
This depends on the physical characteristics of both the
device which executes the neuron computation as well as
the fault injection device. Fault attack literature within cryp-
tography normally assumes a single fault adversary model,
which in our case means that the attacker can inject exactly
one fault during one neuron computation.
Generally, implementations of deep neural networks can
run on various devices, the most popular being general pur-
pose microcontrollers, graphic processing units, and field
programmable gate arrays. Each of these devices works in a
different way, and might use a different machine represen-
tation of floating point numbers.
Literature focusing on fault attacks normally assumes
following fault types:
• Bit flips: this type of fault is considered to be the most
advanced as it allows the attacker to precisely pinpoint
the bit she wants to flip.
• Random byte (or word) faults: this is a relaxed fault type
that assume there is a change in a single byte or a single
word, but the value of the change is not known to the
attacker. It is considered to be the most practical data
fault.
• Instruction skips: another practical fault is instruction
skip that simply skips the execution of one or more
instructions in the sequence. It was shown to be a very
powerful attack type [15].
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Fig. 2. Neuron computation of neural networks.
• Instruction changes: in some cases, it is possible to dis-
turb the instruction opcode in a way that it changes
one instruction into another, resulting in a different
operation.
3 METHODS
To be able to reverse engineer a neural network with fault
injection attack, we first need to know the erroneous behav-
ior of its elementary components – neurons. To study this
behavior, we first identify each part of a neuron that can be
faulted.
3.1 Possibilities to Fault a Neuron
Figure 2 shows a typical neuron computation in a neu-
ral network. Inputs are multiplied with weights and then
summed together, adding a bias. Resulting value is fed to
the activation function, which produces the final output of
the neuron. Below, we identify the points where a fault can
be introduced (numbers correspond to those in Figure 2):
1. Inputs: there are two possibilities to fault the input –
either at the output of a neuron from the previous
layer or at the input of the multiplication of the current
neuron. The first case affects the computation of all the
neurons in the current layer, while the second case only
affects the target neuron.
2.-3. Weights, Product: unlike faulting the input, weight or
product change only affects the target neuron. As we
explain later in this paper, attacks on these values can
give the attacker knowledge of the weights.
4.-5. Bias, Summation: attacks on bias can slightly change
the input to the activation function, while the attacks
on summation can change this greatly. Therefore, the
latter one can be considered as one of the means of
misclassification by faults.
6. Activation function: Fault attacks on activation function
were studied in [5] from instruction skipping perspec-
tive. If attacked with a sufficient precision, they can
cause misclassification.
3.2 Experimental Setup
In this work, we consider different models which were
pretrained using transfer learning [13] on ImageNet dataset,
4following deep-layer feature extractor approach. We use
several models which are available in public libraries, such
as Keras [16] and PyTorch [17], and for the experiments, the
last fully connected layers are removed and substituted with
single fully connected layer, and retrained. For the training
data, the visual dataset for object recognition task, CIFAR-
10 [18], is used. The CIFAR-10 dataset contains 50k training
data, and 10k test data, each of which is a 32×32 pixels color
image. First, the images are upscaled to be consistent with
the dimension used in the pretrained model, followed by
normalization. Next, we add a Dense layer with 10 neurons
at the output, corresponding to 10 classes in the dataset.
The activation function used is softmax. Global Average
Pooling or Flatten is used before the dense layer to reduce
the number of neurons at the output of pretrained networks.
3.3 Adversary Model
We consider an adversary model, where the adversary
aims at IP theft for overproduction and illegal cloning
of ML proprietary models, running on edge/IoT devices.
The proprietary ML models are carefully derived through
transfer learning from popular and open ML models
like AlexNet [19], VGG-16 [20], ResNet-50 [21], Inception
V3 [22], etc. While the initial layers are publicly known,
the adversary aims at recovering the parameters of the re-
trained fully connected layers. To enable model recovery,
adversary acquires few legal copies of the target (ML Model
running on edge/IoT nodes). Being a legal user, the adver-
sary can use the target devices with known data and inject
faults into the device. Fault injection is followed by secret
parameters recovery. This is a case of IP theft that allows
adversary to overproduce/clone the ML model on huge
number of devices without paying the legal licence.
3.4 SNIFF – Sign Bit Flip Fault
The attack model for our work is bit flip on the sign bit
of the intermediate values. In particular, we consider attack
on two intermediate values: SNIFF on the product of the
weight and the input, and SNIFF on the bias value.
SNIFF attack on the product can be achieved in the real
device by targeting either the input, the weight, or the final
product value (targets 1, 2, and 3 in Figure 2). In Section 4,
we use the bit flip fault on the weight to model this attack.
In case of SNIFF attack on the bias value, the attacker has to
target the bias itself (target 4 in Figure 2).
3.5 Finding the Correct Timing for Faults
Once the target step is identified, one needs to find precise
timing locations corresponding to the sensitive computa-
tion. As already demonstrated in [4], it is possible to deter-
mine the timing by using side-channel information, coming
either from the power consumption of the device or from
electromagnetic emanation (EM).
It can be shown in the example of a 4-layer MLP with
50, 30, 20 and 50 neurons in each layer respectively from the
input layer, on ARM Cortex-M3 microcontroller mounted on
the Arduino Due. The electromagnetic emanation measured
through a near field probe (RF-U 5-2 H-field probe from
Langer) is shown in Fig. 3. In Fig 3 (a) each layer can be eas-
ily identified. Next, Fig 3 (b) shows a zoom on computation
of the first neuron of the third layer. Given the (50, 30, 20,
50) architecture of the MLP, 20 multiplications are expected
followed by the activation function. Each multiplication can
be easily identified in Fig 3 (b) and thus precisely targeted
with faults.
4 RECOVERY OF SECRET PARAMETERS
In this section, we will explain the recovery of the weights
and biases of the last layer of deep-layer feature extractor
model, constructed by using transfer learning.
4.1 Attack Intuition
The intuition of the parameter recovery attack is as follows.
As shown in Figure 1, the attack works on the last layer of
the student network. The detail of this layer is illustrated in
Figure 4. The attacker first executes the model computation
on last layer input I = (I1, I2, . . . , In) without fault injec-
tion, and observes the outputs – classes and corresponding
probabilities from the last softmax layer. Then, she injects
faults into the last layer, performing SNIFF on each product
of the weight and the input (Ii × wij), as well as SNIFF
on each bias value (bS,i). Based on the original (non-faulty)
output values and the faulty ones, she will recover all the
parameters in the last layer.
4.2 Formalization
In this section we formally describe the attack. Suppose
there are k layers in the teacher neural net, and for an
input x, the output is given byLk(Lk−1(. . .L1(x))), where
Li denotes the function at layer i, which takes the output
of the previous layer and gives input for the next layer. For
example, k = 1 and L(x) = sigmoid(xTW + b) denotes a
fully connected one layer network with weight matrix W ,
bias vector b and activation function sigmoid.
Let OθT,−1 denote the part of the teacher neural network
that was preserved by the student neural network, i.e.
OθT,−1(x) := Lk−1(. . .L1(x)).
Here θT,−1 denotes the parameters of the first k − 1 layers
of the teacher neural network.
LetWS and bS denote the trained weight matrix and bias
vector for the last layer of student neural network. Suppose
the k − 1th layer of teacher network has n neurons and the
output layer of student network has m neurons. Then we
have WS is an n×m matrix and bS is a vector of length m.
For an input x, the output of the student neural network is
then given by
Oθ(x) = Softmax(OθT,−1(x)TWS + bS),
Let y(x) := OθT,−1(x)TWS + bS , then we have for i =
1, 2, . . . ,m,
Oθ,i(x) = exp yi(x)∑m
j=1 exp yj(x)
.
By out assumption, the attacker knows the teacher neu-
ral network and she can also observes the Softmax output,
in particular, she knows the number m and hence the
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Fig. 3. Electromagnetic emanation measurement during the computation of 4-layer MLP with 50, 30, 20, 50 neurons in each layer. In (a) each
layer can be uniquely identified by the measurement trace, while (b) shows execution of one neuron in third layer showing timing of each of the 20
multiplications.
...
...
y1
ym
I1 × w
11
I2 × w21
I3
× w3
1
I n
×
w
n
1
b
S
,1
bS
,m
Last hidden
layer
Output
layer
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the weights wij and biases bS,j are the target for the recovery.
dimensions of WS and bS . knows the architecture of the
student neural network. Our goal of model extraction then
consists of recovering θ, the parameters for the student neu-
ral network. Let θS := {WS , bS}, then θ = θS ∪ θT,−1. Note
that θT,−1 are the parameters from the teacher network.
Thus our goal is to recover θS , or equivalently, WS and bS .
Definition 1. An input x is called a non-vanishing input for i
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) if OθT,−1,i(x) 6= 0.
For simplicity, let I(x) denote OθT,−1(x). As described
in Section 3.4, we consider SNIFF on the product Iiwij and
on the bias bS,j .
We refer to the unknown weight wij as the target weight
parameter and the unknown bias bS,j as the target bias param-
eter.
Theorem 1. For any j0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} and any input x.
Suppose a SNIFF on target bias parameter bS,j0 was carried out.
Let zj0 and z˜j0 denote the correct and faulted value of Oθ,j0(x).
Then the targeted weight bS,j0 can be recovered as:
bS,j0 =
1
2
ln
(
z˜−1j0 − 1
z−1j0 − 1
)
.
Proof. Let j0 be given and let x be any input. For simplicity,
we write I (resp. y) instead of I(x) (resp. y(x)). Then for
any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m},
yj = bS,j +
n∑
i=1
Iiwij , zj =
exp yj∑m
j′=1 exp yj′
In particular,
yj0 = bS,j0 +
n∑
i=1
Iiwij0 , zj0 =
exp yj0∑m
j=1 exp yj
.
Let
A :=
n∑
i=1
Iiwij = yj0 − bS,j0 ,
B :=
m∑
j=1,j 6=j0
exp yj = zj0 − exp yj0 .
We have
zj0 =
exp(bS,j0 +A)
exp(bS,j0 +A) +B
,
z˜j0 =
exp(−bS,j0 +A)
exp(−bS,j0 +A) +B
.
We note that by definition of Softmax, zi0 > 0 and z˜i0 >
0.
1
zj0
− 1 = exp(bS,j0) exp(A) +B
exp(bS,j0) exp(A)
− 1
=
B
exp(bS,j0) exp(A)
= exp(−bS,j0)
B
expA
.
6Similarly,
1
z˜j0
− 1 = exp(−bS,j0) exp(A) +B
exp(−bS,j0) exp(A)
− 1
=
B
exp(−bS,j0) exp(A)
= exp(bS,j0)
B
expA
.
By definition of Softmax, z−1j0 > 1,
z˜−1j0 − 1
z−1j0 − 1
= exp(2bS,j0) =⇒ bS,j0 =
1
2
ln
(
z˜−1j0 − 1
z−1j0 − 1
)
.
Corollary 1. The attacker can recover the bias vector bS with m
faults and 2m runs of the targeted neural network (the student
neural network).
Theorem 2. For any i0 ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, j0 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and
any x, a non-vanishing input for i0. Suppose a SNIFF on target
weight parameterwi0j0 was carried out. Let zj0 and z˜j0 denote the
correct and faulted value of Oθ,j0(x). Then the targeted weight
wi0j0 can be recovered as:
wi0j0 =
1
2Ii0
ln
(
z˜−1j0 − 1
z−1j0 − 1
)
.
Proof. Let i0, j0 be given, and let x be a non-vanishing input
for i0. For simplicity, we write I (resp. y) instead of I(x)
(resp. y(x)). We let wij denote the (i, j)th entry of the
weight matrix WS . And let bS,j denote the jth entry of the
bias vector bS . Then for any j ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m},
yj = bS,j +
n∑
i=1
Iiwij , zj =
exp yj∑m
j′=1 exp yj′
In particular,
yj0 = bS,j0 +
n∑
i=1
Iiwij0 , zj0 =
exp yj0∑m
j=1 exp yj
.
Let
A := bS,j0 +
n∑
i=1,i6=i0
Iiwij = yj0 − Ii0wi0j0 ,
B :=
m∑
j=1,j 6=j0
exp yj = zj0 − exp yj0 .
We have
zj0 =
exp(Ii0wi0j0 +A)
exp(Ii0wi0j0 +A) +B
,
z˜j0 =
exp(−Ii0wi0j0 +A)
exp(−Ii0wi0j0 +A) +B
.
We note that by definition of Softmax, zj0 > 0 and z˜j0 > 0.
1
zj0
− 1 = exp(Ii0wi0j0) exp(A) +B
exp(Ii0wi0j0) exp(A)
− 1
=
B
exp(Ii0wi0j0) exp(A)
= exp(−Ii0wi0j0)
B
expA
.
Similarly,
1
z˜j0
− 1 = exp(−Ii0wi0j0) exp(A) +B
exp(−Ii0wi0j0) exp(A)
− 1
=
B
exp(−Ii0wi0j0) exp(A)
= exp(Ii0wi0j0)
B
expA
.
Since x is a non-vanishing input for i0, we have Ii0 6= 0.
Also by definition of Softmax, z−1i0 > 1. Together with the
above equations,
z˜−1j0 − 1
z−1j0 − 1
= exp(2Ii0wi0j0) =⇒ wi0j0 =
1
2Ii0
ln
(
z˜−1j0 − 1
z−1j0 − 1
)
.
Thus the attacker can recover an i0, j0 entry of the weight
matrix WS , by first running an offline phase to find a non-
vanishing input x for i0, then with two runs of the student
neural network - one without fault and one with fault.
Corollary 2. The attacker can recover the weight matrix WS
with mn faults and 2mn runs of the targeted neural network (the
student neural network).
5 RESULTS
In this part we explain the practical experiment on reverse
engineering using fault injection.
Experimental results for reverse engineering with fault
attacks are stated in Table 1. We targeted deep-layer feature
extractor networks that were based on publicly available
networks, being able to reverse engineer the weights in
the last layer. When it comes to recovery of weights, the
weight precision for all except 3 networks was 10−14, for
the remaining cases it was 10−13. In case of bias recovery,
the precision was always 10−14.
We would like to highlight that the method from Sec-
tion 3 allows the recovery of the exact weight value if we
have arbitrary precision of floating point numbers. In prac-
tice, this depends on the used library, computer architecture,
and settings. For our experiments we used Python with
Keras library (version 2.3.1) for deep learning. This library
uses numpy for floating point number representation, offer-
ing different precision ranging from 16 to 64 bits1. In our
setting we set the float64 to be the default representation
to get the most precise results.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Comparison to Prior Work
The seminal work of Lowd and Meek [30] enabled full
model functionally equivalent extraction for linear models.
Further, full model functionally equivalent extraction for a
2-layer non-linear neural network was proposed by Milli et
al [31] in a theoretical setting. When considering extraction
of fully implemented neural networks, only two works have
come to light. Batina et al. [4] relied on side-channel leakage
on electromagnetic measurements to extract the functionally
equivalent model in a known input setting. They reported
an error on recovered weight of 2.5×10−3, and full network
recovery. Later, Jagielski et al. [14] proposed two attacks.
One of the two attacks enabled full model functionally
equivalent extraction for a 2-layer neural network with a
weight error of only 9× 10−7, which is current state-of-the-
art. This method required access to logit values, which is a
stronger assumption compared to outputs of the softmax
1. Numpy supports up to 128-bit floats, but those are not compatible
with Keras.
7TABLE 1
Experimental results for reverse engineering with faults. We targeted deep-layer feature extractor networks based on publicly available networks
for image classification.
Reverse Engineering
Model No. of Features To Recover Weight Precision Bias Precision
AlexNet [19] 9216 10−13 10−14
GoogleNet (Inception V1) [23] 1024 10−14 10−14
VGG-16 [20] 25088 10−13 10−14
ResNet-50 [21] 2048 10−14 10−14
Inception V3 [22] 2048 10−13 10−14
Inception ResNet V2 [24] 1536 10−14 10−14
Wide-ResNet-50-2 [25] 2048 10−14 10−14
DenseNet-201 [26] 1920 10−14 10−14
Xception [27] 2048 10−14 10−14
ResNeXt-101 32x8d [28] 2048 10−14 10−14
NasNet-A (6 @ 4032) [29] 4032 10−14 10−14
Fig. 5. Functionally equivalent model extraction: The difference in test
accuracy between the actual model and recovered model against the
parameter precision up to certain floating point digit. If the parameter
values are the same up to the second decimal point, the test accuracy of
the recovered model is the same as the original one for all the evaluated
networks.
function used in our approach. The other method they
developed enabled full model extraction preserving task
accuracy and fidelity.
Compared to these prior works, the goal of our work is
exact extraction. When experimentally testing our method
with Keras and Pytorch, the recovered weight error of our
fault assisted approach was at most 10−13. It must be noted
that the stated error is the precision error of the Python libraries
used in our experiments. Otherwise, our proposed method can
provably recover the exact weights. The comparison is summa-
rized in Table 2.
6.2 Selecting Model Extraction Method
It is important to understand the purpose of the model
extraction attack – after that, it is possible to determine
what type of attack should the attacker choose, ultimately
deciding the difficulty of the extraction.
If the main goal is to have a task accurate extraction or
functionally equivalent extraction, the attacker can achieve
this by querying the network with a set of inputs and
observing the outputs [14], [31]. In this case, the extracted
network might have a different architecture than the original
one, but will perform well on the same or similar task.
As can be seen in Figure 5, for functionally equivalent
extraction, it is enough to be able to recover the parameters
with the precision of two floating point digits for all the
considered networks. However, if the task changes, the
extracted network might give different output than the orig-
inal one, as it was not trained the same way. For example,
some attackers might be interested in robustness of a certain
network to a set adversarial examples, but are not able to
query the original network with the entire set. In such case,
task accurate extraction will not help as it will not reveal the
vulnerability of the original network by testing the extracted
network. As the adversarial examples are often very close
to decision boundaries [32], precision of the parameters is
crucial to assess the vulnerability. For such scenarios, it
is necessary to have extracted network that is as close to
the original network as possible. That is a task of exact
extraction.
7 PROTECTION TECHNIQUES
In this section we will outline different techniques that can
help protect neural network implementations against fault
injection attacks.
7.1 Overview
In general, the protection techniques against fault injection
can work either on device level, or implementation level.
Device level techniques focus on preventing the attacker to
reach the chip, by various forms of packaging, light sensors,
etc. [33]. The goal is to increase the equipment and expertise
requirement to access the chip in a way that the possible
reward for the attacker for doing so will be lower than
the effort she has to put in. Device level techniques can
also have a different working principle – to detect potential
tampering with the chip. In this case, a hardware sensor that
checks environmental conditions can be deployed [34], [35],
[36].
Implementation level techniques aim at detecting changes
in the intermediate data. Detection can be achieved by
using various encoding techniques, ranging from simple
ones such as parity [37], to sophisticated codes that can
be customized to protect against specific fault models [38].
Another approach is performing the computation several
times and comparing the result. A different way to use
8TABLE 2
Comparison With Prior Work targeting direct model extraction. ∗ denotes that technique has null precision error. In our experiments the error
reported was at most 10−13, which is the precision limitation of the used Python libraries.
Attack Leakage Source Weight Error Target Network Goal
[30] Labels N/A Linear models Functionally equivalent
[31] Gradients/logits N/A 2-layer neural network Functionally equivalent
[4] EM Side-Channel 2.5× 10−3 Full network Functionally equivalent
[14] Probabilities/logits 9× 10−7 2-layer neural network Functionally equivalent
This Work Faults/Probabilities 0 (10−13)∗ 2-layer neural network Exact extraction
redundancy is to perform it at the instruction level, either
by generating instruction sequences that replace the original
vulnerable instructions [39], or by re-arranging the data
within the instructions to make it hard to tamper with
without detection [40]. However, there is no straightforward
way of using these two techniques for protecting DNNs. It
is important to mention that unlike device level techniques,
the implementation level countermeasures normally incur
significant overheads, either in time, circuit area, or power
consumption.
Protecting the learning phase. Additionally, there is a line
of work that focuses on protecting the learning phase of
the deep learning method [41]. Such protection technique
might be useful in case the learning does not happen in
a protected environment and there is a significant risk of
faults coming either from the environment or from the
attacker. In our work we consider the model is already
learned and therefore, the attacker is trying to tamper with
the classification phase.
7.2 Analysis
Analysis of overheads and coverage of each countermeasure
that can be used against instruction skips presented in
earlier sections is stated in Table 3. Here, we provide more
details on each technique and its applicability to DNN.
Spatial/temporal redundancy. This is the most straight-
forward way to protect a circuit. Implementer can choose
the number of redundant executions depending on what
attacker model is expected. In case of redundancy, there
is always an integrity check or a majority voting that de-
cides whether the output is valid or not. When used as a
countermeasure in cryptography, circuit is either deployed
2-3× on the chip (spatial redundancy), or the computation is
repeated 2-3× one after another (temporal redundancy) [42].
Execution times can be randomized so that it is hard to
reproduce the same fault in all the redundant executions.
Software encoding. As the software encoding countermea-
sures are realized by table look-up operations, they are not
directly applicable to neural networks which operate on real
values. However, it is possible to apply this countermeasure
for fixed-point arithmetic networks [43]. As it was shown,
fixed-point arithmetic can provide good results when used
on bigger networks [44]. The timing overhead in this case
is around 75% – for example, let us consider a multipli-
cation operation on AVR architecture: for the unprotected
implementation, there is operand loading into the registers
(2× 1 clk cycle), followed by a multiplication (2 clk cycles),
resulting into 4 clock cycles. For the protected implementa-
tion, there is a register precharge (see e.g. Section 5.1 of [38])
Fig. 6. Hardware sensor protecting the DNN circuit.
of both input registers and the output register (3 × 1 clk
cycle), followed by the operand loading (2 × 1 clk cycle)
and table look-up (2 clk cycles), resulting into 7 clock cycles.
Regarding the area overhead, as stated in [38], in case the
codeword size is ≤ 8 bits, there is a fixed table size of 65 kB
per binary operation (e.g. multiplication). That is why the
area (memory) overhead is huge for this case.
Hardware sensor. Application of a hardware sensor to pro-
tect DNN circuit is depicted in Figure 6. The main advantage
of hardware sensor is that there is no need to change
the underlying implementation of the neural network. The
sensor resides on the front side of the chip, protecting all
the underlying circuits from fault injection. In case there
is a sudden parasitic voltage detected by such sensor, it
raises an alarm. While front side deployment might be
vulnerable to back (substrate) side injection, [34] reported
successful detection of backside injection. Recently, circuit
level techniques were also proposed to enhance backside
detection capabilities [45]. Afterwards, security measures,
such as discarding the output, can be applied. Recently,
a way to automate the deployment of such circuit was
proposed [46].
To summarize, selection of countermeasures depends
heavily on the type of application that relies on DNN
outputs. For security critical application, it would be recom-
mended to combine several techniques together to minimize
the possible attack vectors and make cost of the attack as
high as possible.
8 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a method for provable exact
extraction of neural network parameters with the help of
fault injection. Our method aims at recovering the student
layer of deep-layer feature extractor networks that were
constructed by transfer learning. This is done by changing
the sign of intermediate values to obtain the information
9TABLE 3
Overview of countermeasures effective against skipping instructions.
Overhead
Countermeasure Time Area Coverage
Spatial redundancy (×N ) – N × 100%
Covers up toN−1 faults. To break the countermeasure, faults need to be injected
at the same instruction in all the redundant circuits – which normally requires
multiple fault injection devices.
Temporal redundancy (×N ) N × 100% – Covers up toN−1 faults. To break the countermeasure, faults need to be injectedat the same instruction in all the redundant executions.
Software encoding [38] 75% ≈ 65, 000%
Protects against instruction skips that target one instruction at a time. Although
it does not protect against consecutive instruction skips, during one execution it
can protect arbitrary number of non-consecutive skips with 100% detection rate.
Hardware sensor [47] – 1.1%2
As the sensor is based on detecting voltage variations on the chip surface, the
detection rate depends on the fault injection device parameters. The most recent
work shows high detection rates for both laser and EM fault injection techniques,
97% and 100% detected injections, respectively.
about the parameters with a method called SNIFF – sign
bit flip fault. Our practical experiments show that the exact
recovery ultimately depends on computer architecture and
the precision of the library used. For 64-bit floats used in
Keras, the parameter recovery error was at most 10−13.
For the future work, it would be interesting to look at
methods that would allow extraction of parameters from
deeper layers of a network.
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